in collaboration with
the Federal City Council
"An Overview of the Economic
and Fiscal Condition
of the District of Columbia
BACKGROUND BRIEFING REPORT
This policy briefing report is the second in a series of policy seminars supported by Georgetown University's Graduate Public Policy Program (GPPP).
The GPPP's "D.C. Project" provides faculty and student research resources as a community service to support collaborative efforts addressing the needs of the District of Columbia.
I. The Economy of the District of Columbia
Governance and fiscal issues are at the heart of the discussions about the problems plaguing the District. The District government is overwhelmed with budgetary shortfalls and administrative management challenges which has led to the establishment of administrative oversight by congressional legislation. As its expenditures spiral and its revenue sources decline, the city struggles to provide services for its residents and the over one million commuters and tourists who enter the city every day (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, The Future of Metropolitan Economic Regions, Regional Economic Development in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Statistical Area, p. 2).
As the capital city of our nation and home of the federal government,
the District economy is integrally linked with the federal government. The city
is blessed with a rich history and world-famous monuments, public buildings,
universities, and hotel accommodations. D.C. is a major transportation and
communications hub, a premier center for cultural events, meetings and
tourist destination. In addition to being the center of U.S. politics, D.C. is home
to prominent international organizations and figures. (HUD Report, p. 12).
This section will present information and analysis about the nature and status
of the economy of the District paying special attention to such trends as the
specialization of the D.C. economy, downsizing of government, the
outmigration of the middle class and the high percentage of District workers
living in the suburbs (HUD Report, p. 12).
í the structural changes that have resulted in the District's economy
becoming more specialized while the suburban economy has become
more diversified, and
In the past four years, the District's share of the region's economy has declined at an accelerated pace. This loss of share coincides with the programs of the Clinton Administration to downsize the federal workforce and "reinvent" government. As a consequence of federal policy changes associated with the National Performance Review, the federal workforce has decreased by more than 30,500 full-time jobs in the Washington area in the three years since its July 1993 peak (Fuller, p. 9).
Employment in the District continues on its downward course of the past six years, despite a small increase in July 1996 from 634,200 to 642,200. The federal government has eliminated 9,800 jobs in D.C. from June 1995 to June 1996, while the D.C. government has eliminated another 1,500 jobs in the same period. Employment in the last year has declined by 14,700 jobs (June to June). Most of that was in the public sector (11,300 jobs); some of it was in the private sector (3,400 jobs) (Center for Business and Economic Statistics, D.C. Economy, Vol.5, No.4, October, 1996 p. 3).
The District labor force - District residents who are able and willing to work -
has been declining at an accelerating rate since January 1995. According to D.C.
Economy figures, which have been adjusted for definitional changes and
seasonal variation, the labor force has declined by 25,520 since January 1995.
The unemployment rate has turned up again in the past few months rising to
9.2% in July 1996 among the highest in the nation among cities(Center for
Business and Economic Statistics, p. 3-4). However, the Washington D.C.
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) had the 10th lowest unemployment rate in
the country at 4.2% in July 1995 (HUD Report, p. 8).
During the twenty year period from 1970 to 1990, suburban Maryland's
population increased 300,000 while Northern Virginia exploded from .9
million to 1.5 million. The District boasted a population of 756,510 in 1970, but
by 1990 it had lost 150,000, largely to the suburbs. Another 13,000 residents left
during the 12 month period ending July 1, 1995, bringing the total to well over
50,000 in the first half of the 1990's alone. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates
that D.C.'s 1995 population is 554,000 (See Figures 1 and 2). The net
outmigration is characterized by middle income families moving out which is
reflected in the decline in income tax receipts (HUD Report, p. 7). The District
lost a larger share of its population than all of the nation's 209 largest cities
except Hartford and New Haven, Connecticut and St. Louis, Missouri. Prince
George's County was the leading destination, followed by Montgomery County,
Arlington County, Fairfax County and Alexandria. Other forecasted trends
include a near doubling of persons 65 years and older and a 30% increase in the
number of children (HUD Report, pp. 2, 7-8).
The loss of the tax base endangers the District's ability to function. Table 2 presents the number of District filers by adjusted gross income. For example, 65% of filers in the District have an income less than $30,000. In addition, 33% of filers have an income less than $15,000. Only 17 % of filers have an income of $50,000 or greater (See Table 2).
D.C. Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton introduced the District of Columbia Economic Recovery Act (DCERA) in April 1996. The DCERA is an attempt to offset the outmigration. The bill would reduce federal income tax liability for District residents in three ways:
í The standard deduction and personal exemption would be enlarged - $15,000 for single filers, $25,000 for single heads of households, and $30,000 for married joint filers (See Table 3).
í A uniform rate of 15% would be applied progressively up the income scale to reduce present tax liability.
í The mortgage interest and charitable deductions would remain (Congress. House. D.C. Subcommittee Hearing on H.R. 3244. The District of Columbia Economic Recovery Act of 1996, Opening Statement of Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, p. 1-3).
While D.C. Delegate Norton asserts that the bill would stabilize the
population and spur business and economic development, an opposing view
is that the bill may raise the population of poor and low-income people and
place added pressure on government-provided services (Brookings Institution,
"Press Release: Brookings Will Explore Options To Avert District of Columbia
Insolvency," April 1, 1996).
The District's economy has become more specialized in the past twenty-five years while the suburban economy has become more diversified. This specialization is the first important dynamic in the area's changing economy. The principal difference that distinguishes the District's economy from that of other cities/states is the dominance of government employment which account for 36.8% of all District jobs in 1995, more than double the proportion of government workers that is found in the national economy. The private sector represents 63.2% of the District economy and of these a disproportionately large 41.8% (over specialization) were located in services. The other sectors of the D.C. economy: construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, and real estate account for a combined 21.3%. This 21.3% reflects a substantial under specialization when compared with the same sectors in the suburbs amounting to 54.5% of the suburban economy which presents many more diverse job opportunities (See Table 4).
The government-related nature of the District's service sector is evident in the high proportion of jobs in membership organizations, legal services, services to buildings, hotels/motels, personnel, education, and engineering and management services (See Table 5). Moreover, the District's economy has become less diverse over the past 25 years in contrast to the Washington suburban and national economies. In other words, the District's principal private sector economic functions are substantially interdependent with its federal functions and have become more so in recent years (Fuller, p. 4). This lack of diversity makes the District economy more vulnerable to changes in federal spending than its suburbs (Fuller, p. 2-5). The downsizing of government has a rippling effect on the economy, experienced most recently in the government shutdowns of fall 1995.
The District's economy has experienced only nominal growth in the overall employment base. The 10.2 % gain in jobs in the District since 1970 is well below the national pace of 64.3 % growth and compares poorly with the 146% job gain in the Washington suburbs (Fuller, p. 6). While 44% of the jobs in the metropolitan area were based in the District in 1970, between 1970 and 1985, the suburbs added 18 jobs for every one added in the District (KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, p. 24). This shift in the geographic distribution of jobs within the Washington metropolitan area is a second important dynamic in the area's changing economy. The city/suburban job distribution changes have reinforced the specialized nature of the District economy (Fuller, p. 6).
Additional factors affecting the workforce include the quality and
availability of education. The District per student spending is among the
highest in the nation, yet the District consistently ranks near or at the bottom
The demands of the workforce are changing rapidly and by 2000, 68% of jobs will require post-secondary education (KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, p. 53-55). Post-secondary education improves employment prospects significantly, with most of this improvement coming from educational attainment below the bachelor's level. Compared to surrounding states, however, the District holds many opportunities for advanced degrees but very few opportunities to earn associate degrees. The Rivlin Report Revisited recommended that the District convert the University of the District of Columbia to a community college which would improve educational opportunities in the District (KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, p. 53-55).
Another factor shaping the District economy is the significant import of
labor from the suburbs. In 1990, two-thirds of all the jobs in the District were
filled by non-District residents. The consequences of this high dependency on
imported labor, most of which (90%) resides in the suburbs, is a significant
leakage of income out of the District economy. More than half of the personal
income generated in the District economy leaks out in the form of salary and
wages (this is a net value reflecting the inflow of earnings by District residents
employed outside of the District) and the percentage of this net outflow has
slowly increased. (See Table 6) While it is obvious that the suburban economy
gains from this transfer of earnings, it is also important to recognize that the
District economy would be substantially smaller in the absence of these non
local labor resources (Fuller, p. 10).
The trends and overall pattern of the District economy developed over the last 25 years have greatly accelerated during the last 10 years. The District's economy has become increasingly dependent on government and government-related services. In contrast, the suburbs have experienced rapid economic growth and become more diversified. Still, the federal government and its related services provide significant underpinning for the suburban economy as suburban labor resources continue to realize substantial economic benefits (income) from the District's economy. Similarly, the District economy continues to derive essential economic inputs from the suburbs that help to sustain an economy far larger than supportable by its residential base (Fuller, p. 12).
Contrary to the widely-held belief that the District has made little or no
effort, the District implemented or partially implemented fully two-thirds of
the Rivlin Commission's recommendations, saving an estimated $819 million.
If the District follows through on the recommendations not yet implemented,
it could realize more than $400 million in additional savings and revenues
(See Table 7). It is critical to bear in mind that some of the recommendations
are beyond the power of D.C. and require action through Congress.
In a study completed by the Mayor's Committee on Economic Development in April 1995, other economic policy priorities identified include the retention of major employers as the primary task to revitalize the city's economy. Major objectives include:
í Increasing household income by creating employment opportunities;
í Revitalizing neighborhoods including housing and commercial/ industrial corridors;
í Assisting local business, especially small and minority owned; and
í Reforming economic planning, statutory and administrative processes to improve the business climate (HUD Report, p. 22).
The Rivlin Report Revisited concludes that addressing the expenditure
side of the ledger must be the first step to revitalize the District. However,
efficiency alone is not going to solve the District's problems. Even if all the
Rivlin recommendations were implemented, the fundamental budget
imbalance would remain due to the unfunded pension liability.
From the outset, the financing of the District of Columbia has been ambiguous, especially the contribution of the federal government. In 1800, when the District was first created, the newly establish government levied taxes and license fees in order to raise funds to pave roads, improve public health and encourage economic development. In 1805, a luxury tax was placed on whiskey, wine, slaves, and carriages and additional money was raised by holding lotteries (Furer, Washington: A Chronological and Documentary History 1790-1970, p. 21). Although Congress realized that the city faced financial constraints as a result of the large amount of tax-exempt land owned by the federal government, it never made any formal pledges of financial support during this period. Congress only provided emergency funds, never creating a continual process for allocating funds to the District.
In 1871, a territorial form of government was created after a group of local business leaders believed Congress should play a bigger role in the District's affairs. They also believed that increased congressional involvement would mean greater financial support. After the District became a territorial government however, Congress did not provide any financial support even though local taxes did not generate enough money to run the city. As a result, the Board of Public Works borrowed money from the Federal government to continue paving streets and improving the sewer facilities. In 1872, the Board was investigated by Congress for mismanagement of funds. Eventually the members were cleared of such charges but as a result of the investigation, Congress limited the debt of the District to $10 million (Diner, Democracy, Federalism, and the Governance of the Nation's Capital, p. 19).
In 1874, Congress created a temporary commission government for the District. The commission government became permanent in 1878 with the passage of The Organic Act. The Organic Act stated that Congress would contribute fifty percent of the District's budget with property taxes and licensing fees making up the rest of the budget. Congress did contribute fifty percent to the District's budget until 1921, when Congress decreased its contribution to forty percent. Each year thereafter, the federal government's contribution to the District declined so that by 1954, Congress's contribution was only 8.5% of the District's budget (Diner, The Governance of Education in the District of Columbia: An Historical Analysis of Current Issues, p. 41). Although The Organic Act benefited the city by formalizing a congressional financial commitment, Congress did not live up to its commitment.
By the early 1970's Congress was in the midst of drafting legislation to grant the District of Columbia home rule. Hearings were convened on Capitol Hill and debates began as to what should be included in home rule legislation. Initial bills granted the District autonomy over how it spent its money. However, several representatives were concerned about allowing District control of its finances. They felt that the District would not spend wisely and in the long run the financial stability of the nation's capital would be compromised (Dissenting Views, p. 131). Many representatives successfully fought for line-item control of the D.C. budget. The final bill, The District of Columbia Self-Government and Government Reorganization Act of 1973 was passed and on January 2, 1975, initiating our current form of home rule government. The federal government still held two key powers: oversight of the District's budget and control over appropriation of the annual federal payment. In addition, the Home Rule Act set limitations on borrowing in section 603(b): "No general obligation bonds or Treasury capital project loans shall be issued during any fiscal year in an amount which would cause the amount of principal and interest required to be paid ... to exceed 14 per cent of the District revenues." Even though the District was granted home rule, the new legislation left the District with little control of its financial situation.
From the inception of home rule until today, the financial condition
of the District has been tumultuous. Figure 3 presents the District's
annual and accumulated surplus/deficit for the years 1980-1997. This figure
shows that the District has always been faced with an accumulated deficit.
The District's financial crisis began to build in the late 1980's. Only
through some accounting mechanisms in 1992 and 1993, such as changing
the property tax year ($174 million in 1993) and transferring income from
the water and sewer fund ($28 million in 1992) did the District manage
to balance its books (McKinsey & Company, "Assessing the District
of Columbia's Financial Future," p. 3). When those accounting changes
are taken into account, the District's fiscal condition looks even bleaker.
In April of 1995, Congress passed The District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act, which established a five member control board to oversee the District. The bill "gave the board broad power to reorganize city government, slash program and reject union contracts if city officials did not cut spending" (CQ Researcher, p. 1047). Although the boards role was initially played down by Andrew F. Brimmer, the head of control board, the control board has recently taken aggressive steps to reorganize the District. In November, the control board fired the school superintendent, hired a replacement, and created a new panel to oversee the school system. These moves reduced the role of the elected school board and created a new era in District politics. Advocates of the control board hope that it will continue to move swiftly to change the financial condition of the city.
The Control Board and District officials are presently facing a fiscal
crisis. This crisis is made up of two components: revenues and expenditures.
How the District raises its revenue and how it spends that money is essential
to understanding the financial condition of the District.
In addition, revenues raised from property taxes are expected to decline
even more in 1996 and 1997, with this downward trend likely to continue
in the future (GAO/T-AIMD-96-133, p. 7).
í The decline in the population in the past quarter century,
from 757,000 in 1970 to 570,000 in 1994, most of whom were middle class
income households (Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1995, p. 28). The flight of the middle class also led
to a decline in the number of remaining residents with jobs (McKinsey
& Company, p. 6). A lower income population means a smaller tax base.
Sales Tax: Between 1988 and 1993, taxable sales in the District fell from over $7 billion to less than $6 billion (McKinsey & Company, p. 7). The factors that have influenced the amount of sales tax collected in the District are:
í The increase in retail developments outside of the city.
In 1995, that formula was discontinued and replaced with a set payment of $660 million. District officials project the payment to remain at that level until 2000 (GAO/T-AIMD-96-133, p. 8). Although discontinuing the revenue based formula was beneficial, setting the amount at $660 million until 2000 has a cost. GAO projects that with inflation, the District will actually lose about $116 in purchasing power during that period (GAO/T-AIMD-96-133, p. 8).
Unfunded Pension Liability:
"The District of Columbia government faces many financial difficulties, but none is more grave and less understood than the mushrooming unfunded liability of the pension plans" (D.C. Appleseed Center, The District of Columbia's Pension Dilemma--An Immediate and Lasting Solution, p i). The current payment the District makes for normal costs of the pensions has become a problem for the District.
The District's pension plans dates back to the early part of the century when Congress created and authorized funding for pension plans for police officers and firefighters, teachers, and judges. However, the funding method was not consistent with actuarial principles which normally provided that moneys be put aside each year to ensure adequate funds were available to meet pension obligations in the future (GAO/HEHS-95-40, "District Pensions: Federal Options for Sharing Burden to Finance Unfunded Liability," p.6). The federal government had created a "pay-as-you-go" method to fund District pensions. When Home Rule was enacted, the federal government transferred $2.7 billion in pension liability to the District with one payment of $38 million to help offset the cost of the unfunded liability.
In 1979, Congress realized that the unfunded liability was a problem
and enacted the District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act of 1979, which
authorized 25 years of annual federal payments of $52.1 million to help
fund these liabilities and reduced benefits. The liability has grown to
$4.7 billion today and is expected to reach $7 billion by 2004, the year
federal payments are supposed to stop (GAO/T-AIMD-96-133, p.12 ). At that
time, federal law will require that the District make payments of $490
million above normal costs every year indefinitely just to freeze the
unfunded liability at $7 billion (D.C. Appleseed Center, p. 12). This
payment of $490 million equals 10 percent of the current general fund
expenditures of $5 billion (D.C. Appleseed Center, p. 13). The District
cannot support such large payments indefinitely.
In addition, the District paid subsidies to both UDC and the D.C. School
of Law. In 1995, the District gave a subsidy to UDC of $50 million. The
District has been cutting back on its payments in recent years from $68
million in 1993 to projected payments of $43 million and $44 million in
fiscal years 1996 and 1997, respectively (GAO/T-AIMD-96-133, p. 14). Even
with a subsidy, UDC is facing a financial crisis and is presently trying
to determine if it will have to close its doors in the Spring. The District
has also been providing a subsidy to the D.C. School of Law, which was
created in 1987. In fiscal year 1992, that subsidy amounted to $4.29 million
(D.C. Office of Policy and Evaluation, Indices, A Statistical Index to
District of Columbia Services, December 1993, p. 270). There has been
recent discussion about the future of the School of Law, specifically
about whether it should continue, be closed down permanently, or consolidated
In April, Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton introduced the District of Columbia Economic Recovery Act (DCERA). This bill is designed to stop the migration out of the District and to stimulate the economy. The DCERA would allow District residents to "claim tax breaks sizable enough to make up for the city's many financial and urban problems" (Norton, Washington Post, "Why D.C. Needs a Tax Break," 7/21/96, p. C7). In addition, the bill calls for a top federal tax bracket of 15% for most city residents and would eliminate the federal tax obligation for disadvantaged residents. Delegate Norton feels that with these tax breaks, citizens will remain in the District and spend their income here. With the renewed spending, the economy would grow. The 104th Congress adjourned without acting on the DCERA, but it is hoped that the 105th Congress will consider action.
The other option for changing the tax structure would be to allow the
District to impose a non-resident tax. A non-resident tax is a tax imposed
on suburban residents who work within the District. These residents work
in the District but take their income to the surrounding counties without
leaving any revenue in the District to pay for the services they use,
such as roads and sewers. Approximately 64% of the income earned in the
District is earned by non-residents, yet the District has no way to regain
those lost revenues. The Appleseed Center estimates that the ban on a
non-resident tax cost the District about $471 million in 1995 (CQ Researcher,
p. 1040). To impose a non-resident tax at this time may not be politically
feasible though. Several members of Congress representing Virginia and
Maryland are adamantly opposed to such action since it adversely effects
their residents. In addition, many other members actually live outside
of the District and do not look kindly on a non resident tax.
One option widely considered is returning these services to the federal government. Albert "Butch" Hopkins Jr., president of the Anacostia Economic Development Corporation, a nonprofit community development organization believes, "the federal government should serve as the state to the District of Columbia" (CQ Researcher, p. 1041). Returning just the Medicaid program to the federal government would have saved the District of Columbia over $343 million in 1993 alone (Liska et al. Medicaid Expenditures and Beneficiaries, p. 37).
In a June 1996 report, the D.C. Appleseed Center presented three options for reforming the unfunded pension liability: leave the unfunded liability as it presently stands; increase the federal contribution; or "transfer the entire $3.6 billion in net assets currently in the Plans' Retirement Fund as well as the Plan participants and liability from the District to the federal government" (D.C. Appleseed, p. 19). Most reformers agree that the first option, the status quo, is unacceptable and in the long run will leave the city financially crippled. The second option, to increase the federal contribution, would be a great improvement over the present situation. However, the D.C. Appleseed Center feels that in order for the city to get back on its feet, the pension liability should be returned to the federal government. Returning the pensions to the federal government, along with other services will allow the city to concentrate on local activities, rather than state-related services.
Alternatives to the Federal Payment
The New York Financial Control Board (FCB) was created in response to
the $1.2 billion operating deficit and $6.2 billion accumulated deficit
that New York City faced at the end of fiscal year 1976. In its first
year, the FCB:
Through the combined efforts of the control board and New York State officials, New York City was able to balance its budget after six years (GAO/T AIMD-96-133, p. 19-20). The FCB has been in an advisory role since fiscal year 1986, after the city sustained six consecutive years of balanced budgets.
Although New York City is a good model to study, it is important to note several differences between New York City and the District. First, the mayor of New York City and the governor of the state were members of the FCB. The mayor of D.C. is not a member of the control board and some argue has been intentionally left out. Second, New York City was able to lobby for federal assistance in Congress. Although the District can attempt to lobby for additional funding, the District does not have voting representation like New York. Lastly, the state was able to provide additional assistance as needed. The District does not have a state to offer support when federal assistance is lacking. As a result, many of the options available to New York City are not available to the District.
By fiscal year 1992, Philadelphia faced an operating deficit of $98.7 million and an accumulated deficit of $153.5 million. The Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority was created to help the city resolve its deficit and in its first year:
* Borrowed $475 million in bonds to fund the cumulative deficit, the
current year deficit, and subsequent deficits;
Although it may not be politically or financially feasible for the District
to immediately institute many of the changes that the cities of Philadelphia
and New York City implemented, it is worthwhile to study the accomplishments
of these cities and use their expertise to help solve the problems of
the District. The District of Columbia is a unique case. It serves as
the nation's capital, but also has specific local concerns and priorities
as expressed by its residents and elected city government officials. The
degree to which the current structure of local and federal relations seriously
undercuts the ability of the community to address the current fiscal and
economic crisis as well as the long-term health of the city should be
seriously considered by all members of the community.
Brookings Institution. "Press Release: Brookings Will Explore Revenue Options To Avert District of Columbia Insolvency." April 1, 1996.
Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C., 1995.
Center for Business and Economic Statistics, University of the District of Columbia. D.C. Economy Vol. 5, No. 3, June 1996.
Center for Business and Economic Statistics, University of the District of Columbia. D.C. Economy Vol. 5, No 4, October 1996.
Congress. House. Committee on the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia Self-Government and Reorganization Act: Report Together with Dissenting Views [to accompany H.R. 9682]. Report 93-492, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. (referred to as Dissenting Views in the briefing report)
Congress. House. Statement of Congresswomen Eleanor Holmes Norton at A Press Conference to Introduce the District of Columbia Economic Recovery Act, April 15, 1996.
Congress. House. D.C. Subcommittee Hearing on H.R. 3244. The District of Columbia Economic Recovery Act of 1996, Opening Statement of Congresswoman Eleanor Homes Norton. July 31, 1996.
CQ Researcher. "Governing Washington D.C." Congressional Quarterly. Vol. 6, No. 44, November 22, 1996.
D.C. Appleseed Center. The District of Columbia's Pension Dilemma-- An Immediate and Lasting Solution. D.C. Appleseed Center, Washington, D.C., 1996.
D.C. Department of Employment Services. "Wages and Salary Employment Annual Average 1985-1995." Washington, D.C. 1996.
D.C. Office of Policy and Evaluation. Indices: A Statistical Index to District of Columbia Services. D. C. Office of Policy and Evaluation, Washington, D.C. December 1993.
D.C. Task Force. "Promoting Stability, Growth, and Opportunity in Our Nation's Capital." Washington, D.C., 1996.
Diner, Steven J. Democracy, Federalism and the Governance of the Nation's Capital, 1790-1974. Center for Applied Research and Urban Policy, Washington, D.C., 1987.
Diner, Steven J. The Governance of Education in the District of Columbia: An Historical Analysis of Current Issues. UDC. Fund/ History-Policy Project, 1982.
Fuller, Stephen. The Economy of the District of Columbia: Its Changing Structure, Importance to the Region and Opportunities for Future Growth. Center for Regional Analysis, Institute for Public Policy, George Mason University, Working Paper. 1996.
Fuller, Stephen. The Impact of the District of Columbia Economy on the Metropolitan Washington Area and Suburbs. Center for Regional Analysis, Institute for Public Policy, George Mason University, Working Paper. 1996.
Furer, Howard B., ed. Washington: A Chronological and Documentary History 1790-1970. Oceana Publications, Inc., 1975.
General Accounting Office. District Government: Information on Its Fiscal Condition. GAO/T-AIMD-96-133. GAO, Washington, D.C., 1996.
General Accounting Office. District Government: Federal Options for Sharing Burden to Finance Unfunded Liability. GAO/HEHS-95-40. GAO, Washington, D.C., 1995.
Henderson, Nell, Mary Ann French. "D.C. Budget Deficit Could be $20 million; Lower Income Tax Collections Blamed." Washington Post. July 18 1991, p. C4.
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP. Four Years Later- The Rivlin Report Revisited. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Washington, D.C., 1994.
Liska, D., K. Obermaier, B. Lyons and P. Long. Medicaid Expenditures and Beneficiaries: National and State Profiles & Trends, 1984-1993. Kaiser Commission on the Future of Medicaid, Washington, D.C., 1995. (referred to as Medicaid Expenditures and Beneficiaries in the briefing report)
McKinsey & Company, Inc., Urban Institute. Assessing the District of Columbia's Financial Future. McKinsey & Company, Washington D.C., 1994.
Norton, Eleanor Holmes. "Why D.C. Needs a Tax Break." Washington Post, July 21, 1996, p. C7.
Parham, Linda. "Commercial Developers, Seeking New Use for Skills, Turn to Asset Management." Washington Post, September 14, 1992, p. F10.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Future of Metropolitan Economic Regions, Regional Economic Development in the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Statistical Area. HUD, 1996.